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The Case for Epistocratic Republicanism 
 
Gwilym David Blunt 
City, University of London* 
 
In September of 2013, I attended the annual Cambridge-YouGov Symposium. Two very 
different speakers struck me as being noteworthy: Nigel Farage, then leader of the United 
Kingdom Independence Party, and Xiang Bing, a visiting Chinese academic. The audience 
found them both rather humorous. Farage’s carnival barker bluster about elites amused 
them. Xiang provoked snickering by claiming that China’s neo-Confucian culture allows the 
most knowledgeable to govern and produces better outcomes than democracy. On the back 
of the Brexit Referendum, the election of President Trump, and general rise of ‘know nothing’ 
populism in the Global North it is doubtful that the audience would be as quick to laugh today. 
Xiang’s argument may seem apposite to many people in the Global North. The tumult of 
contemporary Northern politics has prompted some to look at ways of revivifying decadent 
democratic institutions while other believe that we ought to seriously consider alternatives. 
The republican case for strengthening democratic institutions and cultivating civic virtues 
amongst the citizenry is a case of the former, while epistocracy, rule by the knowledgeable, 
is one of the most provocative and compelling arguments for the latter.  
 
Interestingly, Jason Brennan, the most prominent advocate of epistocracy, argues that 
republicanism and epistocracy are compatible; that a state with epistocratic constraints on 
the electoral franchise would not violate republican commitments to non-domination. It is a 
surprising claim, given that republicans have been amongst the strongest advocates of 
democracy, but there is no prima facie reason to dismiss it. Indeed, many of the prominent 
figures in the history of republicanism have been extremely wary of investing substantial 
power in the general populace. Epistocracy may be a return to the aristocratic tradition that 
has accompanied republicanism throughout its many historical iterations. This article aims to 
test the compatibility claim by asking two questions: can epistocracy provide a path to 
freedom from domination and, if so, is it a surer path than democracy? The answer to the 
first is a hesitant affirmative, but to the second it is a negative, though it is not as obvious as 
one might assume. 
 
There are two caveats to the argument developed in this article: first, this is not explicitly a 
general rejection of epistocracy. After all, an epistocrat may not value liberty and view the 
domination of ignorant citizens as a price worth paying for good governance. The argument 
in this article is directed to republicans who may be sympathetic to the epistocracy as a check 
against the tyranny of the uninformed (and epistocrats who are sympathetic to the republican 
conception of freedom). That said, I do think that an epistocrat will have to do significant work 
to get around concerns about systemic domination if they subscribe to moral individualism 
and respect equal personhood. Second, epistocracy has many variations. Addressing each of 
them in detail is beyond scope of a single article. The focus will generally be on Brennan as he 
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puts forward the compatibility thesis and the only developed case for epistocratic 
republicanism(Brennan, 2016: 94-99). However there is no self-evident reason why the 
argument would not apply to other forms of epistocracy.  
 
The article begins with two sections that are preliminary overviews of epistocracy and 
republicanism; the third section looks at the case for epistocratic republicanism: epistocractic 
constraints prevent domination by the uninformed, while other republican institutions 
effectively protect all citizens from domination. The fourth section examines the case against, 
which focuses on the problem of systemic domination. The final section judges that 
democracy is better at minimising domination while also honouring its value to all persons. 
Consequently, republicans ought to be democrats.  
 
1. Epistocracy 
 
David Estlund(2003: 53) introduced the term ‘epistocracy’ to describe rule by the 
knowledgeable or the wise into the lexicon of contemporary political thought. However, the 
roots of epistocracy run deep with Plato and John Stuart Mill held up as its most important 
forerunners (Estlund, 2003: 55-57, Lippert-Rasmussen, 2012: 242, Mulligan, 2015: 461-2, 
Klocksiem, 2019: 1). Estlund(2009: 30) defines the argument for epistocracy as resting on 
three ‘tenets’:  
 
a) the ‘truth tenet’, there are some ‘true (at least in the minimal sense) procedure-
independent normative standards’ that can used to assess political decisions;  
b) the ‘knowledge tenet’, that some (but relatively few) people have better knowledge 
of these standards than others;  
c) the ‘authority tenet’, that greater knowledge of these standards warrants greater 
political authority.  
 
Estlund accepts the truth and knowledge tenets, but is not convinced that superior knowledge 
can justify political authority. The core of his argument is the ‘demographic objection’, which 
asserts that the educated population of a political community may have damaging epistemic 
biases that cannot be controlled for in a sample but lurk undetected. These biases do not have 
to be driven by malevolence, there just has to be a reasonable chance that they could be 
present but undetected in the minds of the educated (Estlund, 2009: 215-17). This makes 
even moderate epistocracy fail the test of ‘no invidious comparisons’, which requires any 
group that claims expertise needs to pass a general acceptability test (Estlund, 2009: 36). A 
reasonable person might worry about the biases, subconscious or otherwise, that a privileged 
group may possess.      
 
Brennan, however, attempts to sidestep this critique by denying the authority tenet. In 
Estlund’s argument the third tenet is that superior knowledge about politics warrants political 
authority; it is a positive assertion. Brennan reframes the third tenet in negative terms. The 
focus is not on the fact that there are citizens with greater knowledge, but rather that there 
are citizens who are dangerously ignorant. This produces the ‘antiauthority tenet’, where the 
ignorance of some citizens justifies their exclusion(Brennan, 2016: 17). This argument for 
epistocracy is based on the ignorance of some, not the wisdom of others. The basis for 
restricting the franchise is the potential for innocent people to be harmed. To make this point, 
   
 3 
Brennan employs a critique of what has elsewhere been called a ‘reductive strategy’ which 
relies on an analogy between political and interpersonal ethics (Rodin, 2002: 127-28). The 
liberal tradition of political thought has defended the idea that individuals ought to be 
allowed to live in ways which might be harmful to themselves, so long as they do not harm 
other people. There is an argument that democracies have a comparable right to make bad 
decisions in certain conditions, such as pursuing reckless economic policies that result in mass 
unemployment. However, for Brennan, this analogy does not work because there is no unified 
moral personality in the state as there is with individual human beings. Politics imposes 
decisions on other people. Ignorant citizens do not just harm themselves, they harm other 
people (Brennan, 2016: 9). Consequently, the state ought to be structured in a way that 
prevents the ignorant harming the innocent.  
 
As with any complex system of political thought, there are numerous variations of how 
epistocracy could be realised. Brennan(2018: 55-6) has listed several prominent ways: 
 
a) Restricted suffrage on the basis of political knowledge; if a citizen passes a test they 
gain the right to vote(Brennan, 2011, Brennan, 2016: 211-16). 
b) Epistocratic veto: an epistocratic chamber of experts or members elected by the 
knowledgeable possess a veto power over a democratic legislature(Bell, 2016: 152-
78).  
c) Plural voting: all citizens have a vote but citizens who have better educational 
credentials or pass a test would have additional votes(Mill, 2010: 174-6, Mulligan, 
2018). 
d) Enfranchisement lottery: people are randomly selected to become pre-voters and 
then must pass a political literacy test to gain the vote(López-Guerra, 2014: 24-59).   
e) Values only voting: everyone can vote on the ends of government but the means by 
which these ends are pursued are left to experts(Christiano, 2018: 207-43). 
 
There are also what might be considered ‘sci-fi’ examples of epistocratic government in which 
a ‘simulated oracle’ produces the decisions that a fully informed democracy would choose or 
that an algorithm can be used to pick out which voters choose the wisest policies and give 
them greater weight(Brennan, 2016, Mulligan, 2018). Although distinct each of these froms 
of government are epistocratic insofar as voices of the knowledgeable are amplified, whether 
via direct exclusion, uneven weighting, or programming the parameters of ideal information.  
 
2. Republicanism 
 
Like epistocracy, republicanism is an old idea that has enjoyed a revival in recent years. 
Republicanism is built upon a negative conception of liberty that is understood as freedom 
from domination. Brennan(2016: 95) interprets domination in the following way: an agent 
dominates another when two conditions obtain:  
 
a) The agent possesses the capacity to interfere in the choices of another agent. 
b) This capacity can be enacted with impunity.  
 
This accords with how domination has been conceptualised by republicans (Skinner, 2008: 
85, Lovett and Pettit, 2009: 12). It also seems to accord with the condition of the slave, which 
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is used as the paradigmatic example of domination (Blunt, 2015: 6). The slave is in a condition 
where all their choices are the pleasure of their master. This does not require the slave-owner 
to act with malevolence or indeed to act at all. All that is required is the capacity to act with 
impunity. The slave is within her master’s power regardless of the latter’s intentions or 
psychological disposition. It is a structural relationship based on the distribution of power 
between agents or agents and institutions. 
 
Republican political theory is dedicated to ensuring that social institutions are characterised 
by non-domination. This has been expressed by a commitment to the ‘free state’, one in 
which citizens are secure from domination by the state (imperium) and by private citizens 
(dominium) (Pettit, 1997: 36, Skinner, 1998: 66-77). In contemporary political thought 
republicans have been vocal defenders of democracy as a check against domination (Bellamy, 
2007: 210-221, Pettit, 2014: 109-49). By providing all persons with equal political power, 
people can be free from arbitrary interference by political elites. Republicans have stressed 
deliberative and contestatory models to enhance existing democratic practices (Pettit, 2012: 
227-229, 267-69).  Democratic states with the rule of law and strong egalitarian social 
provisions are characteristic of mainstream republicanism 
 
However, the history of republicanism is not a paean to democracy. Cicero(1991: 57-59 
(§1.150)) thought that unskilled labourers were not fit to be free men, because they were 
essentially in a contract of servitude with their master. Francesco Guicciardini argued that the 
virtu necessary to sustain republican government was found only in the aristocracy and that 
the role of the masses was to provide a structure or audience to prevent the degeneration of 
the elite (Pocock, 2016: 127-9).  James Madison(2012: 40-46) clearly distinguished democratic 
and republican forms of government. The former being unacceptable because it is 
inseparable from factionalism and the tyranny of the majority. Consequently, Brennan’s fears 
about the ignorant and misinformed are not alien to the republican tradition.  
 
3. The Case for Epistocratic Republicanism  
 
Brennan conceptualises the problems of democracy very much in the vein of freedom from 
interference. It is the harmful interference of the ignorant that is of concern, but this 
argument can be reinterpreted in the language of freedom from domination. This may, 
indeed, strengthen Brennan’s argument. Democracy allows an uninformed majority to 
arbitrarily harm innocent persons. It is not that democracy causes harm to innocent persons, 
but that democracy provides the capacity for arbitrary interference to the ignorant or 
misinformed. A democratic polity may never harm innocent persons by provoking a financial 
crisis or waging a war of aggression at the behest of a manipulative demagogue, but that they 
possess the capacity to do so is what would alarm republicans. This may lead minorities to be 
in a constant state of supplication and flattery to the uneducated in order to keep them 
‘sweet’. These citizens will not securely possess their freedom, because it can be snatched 
away by the fickle majority. The model of epistocratic republicanism mooted by Brennan is 
based on the exclusion from some people from the franchise if they are unable or unwilling 
to pass a test of their political knowledge. Consequently, the cases for and against will focus 
on this particular form of epistocratic republicanism(Brennan, 2016: 98-99).  
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Democracy, here, is not a necessary condition for freedom from domination. He agrees with 
Pettit that empowering citizens and encouraging civic engagement is a way to protect against 
domination, but this does not necessitate that every person have a vote. He argues that this 
might be plausible in the case of groups of people rather than individuals. The 
disenfranchisement of all black people, he argues, would produce a domination complaint 
because it would expose all black people to arbitrary interference along racial lines, but this 
does not mean that all black people need to be enfranchised. There is no distinction between 
all black people holding the franchise and all black people but one holding the franchise. 
Political liberties empower groups, but they do not empower individuals (Brennan, 2016: 97-
98). If some members of a group of citizens are enfranchised this would be sufficient to 
prevent unenfranchised members of this group from being dominated. One is protected so 
long as some ‘people like me’ have the vote, because they will vote to protect themselves. 
The ‘Jamie Lannister’ objection is to say what if there are no ‘people like me’? This is dismissed 
by saying that, as people have numerous overlapping identities, no person is unique in this 
sense. Moreover, democracy is only one of many institutional means used by republicans to 
check domination. Deliberative and contestatory forums, publicly known laws that are 
impartially enforced, limitations on campaign finance, and robust welfare provisions, civic 
education and solidarity all of these are compatible with epistocracy. If these are sufficient to 
check domination in democracies then they should be able to do the same in an epistocracy 
(Brennan, 2016: 99).  
 
The argument that democracy and republicanism are not intrinsically connected has been 
more precisely developed by Frank Lovett. Democracy, he argues, may be an effective check 
against domination but it is not essential. Freedom from domination is essentially procedural 
in nature. So long as there are sufficient external checks on the exercise of power, there can 
be freedom from domination. It does not need to be check by the agent who is subjected to 
it. This is because in the presence of a third-party invigilator, power would no longer rest on 
the will of the empowered agent. It would be constrained and therefore non-arbitrary (Lovett, 
2010: 115). If a person knows her rights and they are impartially enforced, then she is not 
dominated. This becomes evident when you compare her condition with that of a slave. A 
slave lives in a permanent condition of uncertainty. Any choice she makes is subject to the 
veto of her owner. She is unable to exercise her autonomy with anything close to certainty. 
Compare this with the unfranchised citizen of an epistocratic republic. She might not be able 
to vote, but she knows her rights and they are impartially enforced. If an epistocrat attempts 
to arbitrarily interfere in her choices she will have recourse to the law to check this attempt. 
She is not vulnerable to arbitrary interference because of the protection of third-party 
invigilation. If this were not the case the root injustice would be failures in the rule of law 
rather than epistocracy. 
 
The matter of unequal enfranchisement may still be a problem. A citizen who lacks voting 
rights might not be able to pass the republican ‘eyeball test’; Pettit (2012: 84-86) claims that 
republican freedom enables people look each other in the eye, they ‘can walk tall and assume 
the public status, objective and subjective, of being equal in this regard with the best.’ Can a 
person without equal voting rights the eyeball test or would it be a point of shame? 
Brennan(2016: 99) does not engage with this problem as, for him, this is a question about the 
‘expressive meaning of unequal political rights’ rather than a problem related to freedom or 
power. It is a symbolic concern rather than a substantive concern about arbitrary power. 
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Under this argument they might be able to pass the eyeball test as they still have a set of 
publicly known and impartially enforced rights, which under Brennan’s scheme protects 
fundamental interests. They are not supplicants.  
 
The case for epistocratic republicanism is robust. Indeed, by framing the critique of 
democracy as a concern about domination, it may strengthen Brennan’s argument. Although 
it may be uncomfortable to republicans with strong democratic commitments, it seems that 
they must concede that epistocracy can secure freedom from domination. If there is a case 
against it, it must unpick the argument of this section or show that democracy is a surer check 
against domination than epistocracy.     
 
4. The Case against Epistocratic Republicanism 
 
The previous section showed that it is possible to conceive a state where citizens are not 
enfranchised, but thanks to publicly known and impartially enforced laws they are not liable 
to arbitrary interference. They have a zone in which they might pursue their plans with a 
degree of confidence necessary for minimal autonomy. This matches Brennan’s(2016: 10, 94-
99) epistocratic state where all citizens possess civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, 
but not all citizens have the political liberty to vote . This indicates that epistocratic 
republicanism is a coherent position; there is nothing incompatible between unequally 
distributing the franchise and freedom from domination. If people are not vulnerable to 
arbitrary interference then they seem to be living under conditions of republican freedom 
even if they are denied the vote. This conclusion, however, is only available if one subscribes 
to a simplistic version of domination. Brennan successfully captures a mode of domination in 
his argument, but it is not a holistic engagement. This section will argue that epistocratic 
regimes are characterised by systemic domination.  
 
In recent years many republican philosophers have embraced conceptions of domination that 
go beyond interactional or ‘agent-centred’ approaches (Laborde, 2010: 57, Bohman, 2012: 
182, Pettit, 2012: 35-44, Pettit, 2014: 53, Azmanova, 2016: 471-72). We can look to the modes 
of domination to clarify the sources and sites of arbitrary power (Blunt, 2015: 19). There are 
personally generated and socially generated sources of domination, but what matters in the 
case of epistocracy is the site, which he divides into interactional and systemic. Interactional 
domination occurs between at least two agents. This tends to be the way in which slavery is 
described in a lot of the republican literature. A master possesses the capacity to interfere 
with impunity in the choices available to his slaves. However, this does not capture the 
complexity of slavery as a social institution. She is not only subject to arbitrary interference 
from her master, but has had her place in the basic structure of society arbitrarily determined 
in a way she cannot contest. Slaves are subject to two modes of domination; they experience 
arbitrary interference on an interactional level from their owners and various surrogate 
agents, but they have also had their role in the social institution arbitrarily defined in a way 
that they cannot contest or challenge without engaging in resistance. For example, during his 
time as a slave Isaac Johnson befriended another ‘slave’ named Bob. Bob was a freeman from 
Canada who was wrongfully arrested while travelling in the South and was declared a fugitive 
slave. He had no way to assert his status as a free man. He later was brutally murdered in an 
attempt to escape (Johnson, 1901: 26-31). The problem with Lovett’s arugment is that he 
neglects the systemic elements of domination; he presents an idealised apartheid example 
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where the majority of citizens possess fewer rights based on their race. The laws in this society 
are publicly known and impartially enforced. A white police officer who arbitrarily interfered 
in the rights of black citizen would face sanctions. Be that as it may, the black majority would 
still suffer from domination because their place in society has been arbitrarily circumscribed. 
They may not suffer from interactional domination, but they are systemically dominated. A 
admissions officer, for example, who refuses the application of an otherwise qualified black 
applicant to a whites-only university does not interactionally dominated the applicant as she 
is following the rules, but the applicant is dominated because her status has been arbitrarily 
determined(Blunt, 2015: 15-17).  
 
Epistocracy might escape this objection. Lovett gives no impression that there is a way to 
become enfranchised in his example as the discriminated majority cannot change their race. 
Epistocracy is different, because there is often a pathway to the franchise or to increase the 
weight of their vote (though not in the case of the enfranchisement lottery or the simulated 
oracle). A person may find themselves without voting rights or with minimal voting rights, but 
not necessarily in perpetuity. An unfranchised person can gain the requisite political 
knowledge to be granted the right to vote. We can assume that an epistocratic republic would 
include a publicly known and impartially enforced way for citizens to gain the vote. This would 
give all citizens the power to contest their position within the state. If they have this, it seems 
as though they cannot suffer from systemic domination. However, a perennial question 
lingers: quis custodiet ipsos custodes? In the case of epistocracy, David Runciman(2018: 184) 
has provided an appropriate reinterpretation: ‘who gets to set the exam?’ 
 
This domination complaint is prefigured in the ‘demographic objection’ to epistocracy which 
was mentioned earlier in the article: education is closely associated with privilege and may 
bring with it a number of known and unknown biases that negate its benefits. Estlund(2009: 
36, 215-17) makes the provisio that when assessing potential epistocrats there ought to be 
‘no invidious comparisons’; the concern that there could be empirically latent prejudices 
which negate the benefits of education is sufficient to reject all potential candidates or groups 
of candidates. Several critics of epistocracy have reinforced this point that educated people 
are no less prone to cognitive biases and groupthink as anyone else (Runciman, 2018: 183-
84, Klocksiem, 2019: 14-16, Bhatia, 2018: 12-13). However, the republican concern with 
systemic domination is more parsimonious. The demographic objection implies that if one 
could track all harmful prejudices and deselect would-be epistocrats as a result, there would 
be no issue with epistocracy. However, this would not be sufficient to dismiss the republican 
concern about systemic domination. The problem is not with prejudice, known or otherwise, 
but with the capacity to exercise arbitrary power. A problem still exists with the unprejudiced 
epistocrat because they can exercise systemic domination over the status of other citizens. It 
may be exercised benevolently, but that is beside the point. The issue is the structure of 
power between agents and institutions. One can imagine a benevolent slave-owner who 
treats the people she owns very well and never interferes in their lives, but her slaves would 
still be slaves. They would still be subject to her whims. The ability of the epistocrats to ‘set 
the exam’ gives them arbitrary power over the status of their fellow citizens; it does not 
matter if they abuse it. The psychological disposition of the epistocrats is immaterial to a 
republican.   
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Anne Jeffrey(2018: 422) offers a potential reply to this problem when she suggests that the 
power wielded by epistocrats would not be arbitrary because the standards are independent; 
they are not based on their whims, but on ‘reason’. She suggests that their status gives them 
pro tanto authority that is not absolute, but can only be challenged by people using 
acceptable evidence to challenge their authority. She provides the example of medical staff 
working in Liberia during the Ebola outbreak. They found that despite the efforts of public 
health specialists the disease continued to spread. One of the factors causing this the non-
compliance of ordinary people due to cultural and religious beliefs about the disease. These 
citizens did not have proper reasons to discredit the ‘epistemic authority’ of the medical staff 
and there was no obligation to listen to such people (Jeffrey, 2018: 423). The problem with 
this argument is that it depends on internal restraints. The epistocrats are judges in their own 
case. They determine what is acceptable evidence and what is not as well as who is an 
acceptable speaker and who is not. There is no third-party invigilation. This is not compatible 
with freedom from domination because the determination of what is appropriate knowledge 
rests on their will. Jeffery’s example seems unproblematic, but it can be contrasted with 
particular scandals in humanitarian assistance. In 2018, The Times alleged that senior Oxfam 
staff in Haiti had paid earthquake survivors for sex and an internal report had described a 
‘culture of impunity’ amongst aid workers in the country (O’Neill, 2018). This is not an isolated 
incidence. In 2002, the United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Refugees and 
Save the Children-UK discovered widespread sexual exploitation of women and girls in East 
African refugee camps by aid workers (Reyes, 2009: 215-6). These men were in a position to 
use their control over vital goods and employment opportunities to exercise arbitrary power 
over their victims. This is not to say that humanitarian aid is rife with sexual exploitation of 
vulnerable people, the point is that placing one’s faith in goodwill, professionalism, or 
rationality is not sufficient to check domination and it is a dangerous gamble.  
 
Brennan’s response to the demographic objection is comparable to the previous argument. 
He points out that licensed professions, such as doctors, often are over populated by socially 
advantaged groups. This does not make them intrinsically unjust or necessitate their 
abolition; it only means that we ought to remedy the underlying injustices that cause such 
imbalances(Brennan, 2018: 60-1). This argument does not have much weight against 
concerns of systemic domination. The problem is with the regulation of the regulators and 
this becomes more pressing when considering political power. In most circumstances, my 
relationship with my doctor is a voluntary one. If I think she is wrong, I can get a second 
opinion. State membership tends to be involuntary in a meaningful way. If I disagree with a 
law and break it, I can be sanctioned by the state. There are, of course, ways to exit the state, 
but they tend to have a much higher cost than changing one’s physician, but in order for a 
social relationship or institution to be dominating the asymmetry of power must be sufficient 
to produce dependency, which is characterised by unreasonably high exit costs. (Lovett, 2010: 
38-41, Blunt, 2015: 5, 11). The epistocrats are self-licensed in a relationship with high-exit 
costs. The republican concern about this is captured by James Harrington’s(1992: 22) claim 
that non-domination requires a division of powers. He gives the example of two children 
deciding how to divide a cake. The fair way to do this is let one child cut the cake and the 
other child choose the first piece. The epistocrat wants to cut the cake and choose the first 
slice. The democrat is not in the position to cut and choose as the epistocrat. At least in a de 
jure sense everyone gets an equal slice.  It may be true that there is a difference between the 
de jure and de facto operation of democracy, but at this point it seems wise to adopt the 
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‘good faith’ view advocated by Brennan for democracy as well as epistocracy. If democracy, 
constrained by republican institutions, operates according to plan then it does not seem 
vulnerable to systemic domination. The same cannot be said of epistocracy because the 
necessary checks against the control over the pathway to the franchise must be set and 
enforced by the epistocrats. If it were otherwise, then it would difficult to call this epistocracy 
since the knowledgeable would not be in power.  
 
4. Judging the Cases 
 
The case for epistocratic republicanism argues that democracy leaves citizens vulnerable to 
the arbitrary interference of ignorant or misinformed compatriots, while the case against 
claims that epistocracy runs the risk of systemic domination. This section will seek to examine 
which approach provides a better path to freedom from domination. Brennan(2016: 10-14) 
takes an instrumentalist approach judging democracy and epistocracy; we should judge 
political systems as means to an end, not ends in themselves.  His analysis relies on how well 
systems of government track ‘the truth’ or produce ‘good decisions’, but republicans cannot 
be so general (Brennan, 2016: 13). Republicans tend to be instrumentalist in their approach 
to government. A value, such as freedom, should act as a goal for an agent or institution when 
the purpose of the agent or institution is to promote that value. In the case of republicanism, 
the state’s goal is to minimise domination(Lovett, 2010: 170-79). However, this cannot be a 
blank cheque. A value can also act as side-constraint when the purpose of that agent or 
institution is to honour the value in question (Pettit, 1997: 97-8). Contemporary republicans 
would find it difficult to support a republican system of government that minimised overall 
domination by brutally dominating a very small number of citizens. Honouring the value 
means that we must recognise that freedom from domination is equally valuable to all 
persons. Diverging from an egalitarian baseline would require special justification (Pettit, 
1997: 102). Consequently, we should look at which approach, democratic or epistocratic, best 
minimises domination while also respecting its value to all persons.  
 
The case for epistocratic republicanism rests on the concern that uneducated, ignorant, or 
misinformed persons have the capacity to exercise arbitrary power over their compatriots. If 
the unfranchised citizens are then systemically dominated under epistocratic republicanism, 
then it is a price worth paying for minimising domination in society. These passive citizens will 
enjoy a full set of civil liberties (Brennan, 2016: 8-10). They will not be prone to interactional 
arbitrary interference; they will be able to plan their lives and pursue these plans with 
security. It is a price that can be paid, but is it a price that must be paid? The republican 
tradition has a long-standing fear of ‘mob rule’ and democratic republicans have a number of 
policy options designed to minimise this risk. They have stressed the importance of 
constitutional checks and balances, the rule of law, and individual rights to protect 
minorities(Pettit, 2012: 211-18). Most pertinently, in the case of epistocracy, is the tradition 
of civic education in the republicanism. Civic education is one of the pillars of the republican 
project. Children and young people are supposed to not just learn the formal curriculum of 
how the state works and the duties of citizens, but also the ‘hidden curriculum’ of civility and 
respect (Dagger, 1997: 120-22). The aim is to produce ‘contestatory’ citizens who are able to 
participate in political life in an informed and civil manner (Pettit, 2012: 225-29). This is not 
to say that a state education system aiming to produce citizens who embody the values of 
republican government would be perfect. There will always be people who might not be up 
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to scratch. If excluding them had minimal costs then it might be a justifiable deviation from 
the value of non-domination.  
 
The problem is that the systemic domination that accompanies epistocracy carries with it 
significant risks to those who lack the franchise. Several critics of epistocracy have pointed to 
the use of literacy tests during the Jim Crow era (Estlund, 2009: 215-6, Klocksiem, 2019: 26, 
Umbers, 2019: 291). Between 1956 and 1968 states in the Old South excluded citizens who 
were not able to read or write. At a conceptual level this should not trouble someone like 
Brennan; basic literacy would be a plausible requirement for any epistocratic test. The rule 
was not impartially enforced but used in general to exclude black people. Yet, even if it were 
impartially enforced, black citizens would have been more likely to be excluded due to 
historical and ongoing injustices associated with white supremacy. Brennan has argued that 
this is an unfair criticism of epistocracy because it is placing blame on it for underlying 
injustices(Brennan, 2016: 223-4, Brennan, 2018: 60-1). The idea that citizens must meet a 
minimum level of knowledge to vote is not what damaged black citizens, it was white 
supremacy.  If we wish to make the case against epistocracy, he argues, then we need to 
assume the good faith of the people running it. This argument is not effective against the 
republican concern regarding systemic domination, because the issue is not in the 
background but in epistocratic institutions qua epistocratic institutions. Republicans have no 
interest in whether power is used malevolently or benevolently. All that matters are the 
constraints placed on power. If power has no external constraints and rests on the will of an 
agent, then it is by definition dominating. In the case of the epistocratic tests during Jim Crow, 
the problem is not only background injustices, but that black citizens were the subjects of 
systemic domination because they were not in a position to contest their exclusion from the 
franchise.  
 
The epistocratic republican might concede this point but claim that the risks from systemic 
domination are less than the tyranny of the uneducated. It may be true that they are unable 
to have equal influence or standing, but on the whole the exercise of arbitrary power would 
be reduced. This would fail to appreciate the epistemic injustice associated with systemic 
domination and epistocracy. Miranda Fricker’s conception of epistemic injustice shows that 
control over the production, legitimation, and articulation of knowledge raises its own 
problems of justice. She examines how social power is used to shape identity in a way that 
can produce injustices in discursive exchanges. She has categorised two types of epistemic 
injustice and both a relevant in the case of epistocracy. The first is ‘testimonial injustice’ 
where someone’s inferior social status causes there testimony to be ignored or treated 
without due credit. They are “wronged in their capacity as a knower”(Fricker, 2007: 20). 
Hermeneutical injustice is having a significant area of social experience obscured or occluded 
from collective understanding because of ‘structural identity prejudice in the collective 
hermeneutical resource’(Fricker, 2007: 155). This conception of epistemic justice seeks to 
cultivate virtues as solution to prejudice. One way is the development of testimonial 
sensitivity as a path to testimonial justice. This will identify and correct prejudices in the 
hearer’s judgement of the credibility of a speaker (Fricker, 2007: 86-98). Regarding 
hermeneutical justice, hearers must develop a sensitivity to reduced intelligibility as this may 
be the result of marginalisation from the collective hermeneutical resource (Fricker, 2007: 
169-75). These are important steps and they might go some way to assuaging concerns about 
epistocracy, but republicans need more. James Bohman(2012: 181-84) has developed a 
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republican account of epistemic injustice which is apposite in the case of epistocratic 
republicanism, because it focusses on systemic domination. Epistemic injustice is not only the 
lack of sensitivity in the hearer, but the fact that the speaker does not have a voice that 
commands respect. It is not sufficient that the hearer is sensitive or virtuous if he still 
possesses the ability to dismiss the person speaking to him. This is because the speaker will 
be keenly aware that her voice does not need to be listened to; she may have to adopt the 
position of the supplicant to be heard or moderate her demands. She cannot look him in the 
eye.  
 
This is precisely the problem with epistocratic republicanism. The epistocrat acting in good 
faith and with the cultivated virtue of listening to the marginalised can still perpetrate 
epistemic injustice simply by virtue of his power. Brennan(2016: 212-13) makes an attempt 
to rebut concerns about ‘who sets the test’ by arguing that it can be rendered ‘objective and 
non-ideological’ if it is kept to basic facts about civics which align with the opinions of social 
scientists like economists. This makes a rather controversial move of depoliticising such 
knowledge without much of a defence. Paul Gunn(2019: 31) has pointed out that the move 
basically moves to enfranchise the citizens who vote the way social scientists want them to 
vote. It brings to light the problem of testimonial injustice and systemic domination shown in 
Charles W. Mills’ work on ‘white ignorance’ and academia. Mills, drawing on C.A.J. Coady’s 
work, also emphasises the importance of testimony in generating a social epistemology. If a 
group is discredited in advance our knowledge is shaped accordingly. Their testimony is not 
listened to because they do not have the power to command that they are heard (Mills, 2017: 
67). He casts doubt on the aspirations of Enlightenment rationality, which often privileged 
white perspectives and testimony under the guise of universal truth. The status of a privileged 
knower allowed white people to dismiss the testimony of non-whites. They were ‘primitive’, 
‘backwards’, or racially inferior and so not credible speakers. This enables someone like 
Thomas Jefferson to declare that all men are created equal while simultaneously owning 
slaves and decrying the savagery of Native Americans as colonists drive them from their land 
(Mills, 2017: 62). Udit Bhatia(2018: 13-14) gives the example of ‘the dictators game’ to show 
how people avoid information when it does not suit them. The game gives its players two 
options: the first gives the player a very high pay off and another recipient a very low pay off; 
the second gives the player a slightly lower payoff than the first option, but a much higher 
payoff to the recipient. It was found that players tend to support the second option. However, 
an alternative game masks the outcomes for the recipient but gave the player the option of 
revealing these outcomes at no cost. Players in this scenario are more likely to choose the 
first option and most players who do so do not seek the further information. Those who 
conducted the experiment concluded that there was only an ‘illusory preference for fairness’. 
(Dana et al., 2007: 67) Bhatia(2018: 14-16) mobilises this in his critique of epistocracy to 
explore how epistocrats lack the motivation to engage with structural injustices because of 
epistemic avoidance. It is a compelling argument that is valuable to republicans, because it is 
not only that they lack the motivation, due to internal cognitive biases, but that there is no 
power to compel motivation. It is no coincidence that this is called the ‘dictator’s game’ 
because one of the relevant agents possesses arbitrary power of what information is heard. 
The problems of epistemic avoidance ultimately reduce to epistemic domination; if people 
cannot make you listen then you will only hear what you want to hear.  
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This also drives hermeneutical injustices where an agent cannot be heard because they have 
not had access to the collective hermeneutic resources. They can’t speak the language or 
rather can’t speak with the received pronunciation. This aligns with Mills’ critique of ideal 
theory in political philosophy. The dominance of this approach has helped to occlude lived-
injustices by dismissing them as somewhat epiphenomenal. The assumptions of ideal theory 
cannot be detached from the historical context which produced them, such as white 
supremacy. Indeed, they enable political philosophers to evade uncomfortable connections 
between liberalism and racial oppression. This methodology blinkers academic philosophy. 
Students are trained by academics to think this way, they become academics who think this 
way, and who cite academics who were trained in the same fashion and think in the same 
way. It creates a closed shop where non-ideal concerns can be dismissed as secondary or are 
unintelligible (Mills, 2017: 73-80). This is not malicious. This does not require consciously held 
racism, but can produce a sort of ‘consensual hallucination’ in the privileged group whereby 
they cannot understand the injustices produced by the political system they have made (Mills, 
1999: 18-19). In an epistocracy we can imagine epistocrats simply being unable to understand 
the concerns of the marginalised unfranchised citizen because they speak in ‘regional dialect’ 
rather than ‘received pronunciation’ or in an entirely alien language. The epistocrat might 
dismiss them out of frustration and they do not have recourse. This shows that simply 
declaring that a test can be ‘non-ideological’ because it aligns with received opinions carries 
with it hazards that Brennan does not adequately address.  
 
It might be objected that this argument against epistocratic republicanism is based on 
perhaps the most rudimentary form of epistocracy, a restricted franchise. To this two things 
can be said: the first is that this is the form presented by Brennan(2016: 94-99) in his 
compatibility argument so it is the reasonable that it should be the primary subject of 
criticism; secondly, this problem does seem to be intrinsic to epistocracy. There is not 
sufficient time to go through every variant of epistocracy. However, in the case of plural 
voting, the enfranchisement lottery, and the epistocratic veto power is distributed based on 
passing a political knowledge test (Mill, 2010: 174-6, Brennan, 2011, López-Guerra, 2014: 24-
26, Bell, 2016: 162-68, Brennan, 2016: 211-20). Consequently, the problems about epistemic 
and systemic domination remain. The argument that these tests would be ‘objective’ and 
based on social scientific fact requires a rather naïve approach to epistemology and epistemic 
injustice that expose the excluded to domination. A similar problem afflicts ‘values only 
voting’; it relies on the knowledge of experts to determine the means, but on what basis is 
their knowledge established(Christiano, 2018: 207-43)? If we take Mills seriously, then it is 
unclear why technical expertise makes one immune to bias, conscious or otherwise. The 
voters may want a certain end, but the means selected by the experts may disproportionately 
benefit or burden certain parts of the citizenry in a way that they cannot dispute. The sci-fi 
solutions of ‘simulated oracle’ and algorithmic vetting cannot rest on the assumption that 
because these are machines that can find the ‘right’ or ‘best’ answer they cannot be vehicles 
of domination(Brennan, 2016: 220-22, Mulligan, 2018: 300-2). The biases of programmers 
has become the subject of concern in recent years as experiments in artificial intelligence and 
other complex programming have shown themselves to be less than impartial (Crawford, 
2016, Garcia, 2017). Claiming that programmers have bias depends on underlying injustices 
mistakes the objection; the problem for a republican is not that bias is present but the mere 
presence of the capacity to arbitrarily set the terms of social cooperation. So, while the 
problems of systemic and epistemic domination are clearest in the case of the restrictive 
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franchise, it is not limited to that particular form of epistocracy. It is a problem so long as a 
group may arbitrarily determine what counts as correct knowledge and use that power to 
determine the political status of others. This is an intrinsic part of epistocracy. 
 
Epistemic injustice shows the risks of systemic domination for plausible epistocratic 
constitutions. This is not something that can be easily checked by other republican 
institutions. If non-epistocrats were given control over epistemic power through checks and 
balances, then it would cease to be an epistocracy because the learned would no longer be 
in power. Epistocracy cannot accommodate third-party invigilation from non-epistocrats. 
Even if this was not the case, the problem of systemic domination would persist. There is no 
reason to assume that a third-party invigilator would not also be the source of epistemic 
injustice. The unfranchised citizen would be in the same relationship with them as they are 
with the epistocrats. Given that there are options that can be applied to reduce and check 
ignorance in a political community, such as individual rights and rigorous civic education, the 
divergence from non-domination as a value and the potential loss of overall freedom caused 
by systemic domination is unjustified. 
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